We document empirical patterns of correlation in the adoption of technological innovation and contractual practices among manufacturing …rms in Ethiopia and Sudan. The analysis is based on network data indicating whether any two …rms in our sample do business with each other, whether they buy inputs from a common supplier, and whether they sell output to a common client. We only …nd limited support for the commonly held idea that …rms that are more proximate in a network sense are more likely to adopt similar practices. For certain practices, adoption decisions appear instead to be local strategic substitutes: if one …rms in a given location is using a certain practice, others nearby are less likely to do so.
Introduction
Technological upgrading and institutional innovation are critical to improve productivity and growth. This is particularly true in Africa where productivity has remained low. This begs the question of why productivity-enhancing innovations have not di¤used equally to di¤erent countries or regions (Parente and Prescott 1994) .
This question has attracted a lot of attention in economics. One strand of literature has focused on the transfer of innovations across countries. Researchers have investigated whether …rms learn from exporting, often arguing that exporting facilitates technology transfer because it puts …rms in contact with more advanced …rms in other countries. It is suspected that these contacts provide information about existing technological and institutional innovations while international competition provides the incentive to adopt them in order to remain competitive (Tybout 2000, Kray, Soloaga and Tybout 2002). Studies that investigate whether foreign direct investment raises the productivity of domestic …rms typically follow a similar reasoning. The implicit assumption is that domestic …rms observe the way foreign …rms operate, and learn from it. In a similar vein, Casella and Rauch (2002) and Rauch and Casella (2003) examine whether entrepreneurs with better business contacts abroad behave di¤erently.
Another strand of literature has examined the di¤usion of innovations within countries and regions. Here too a shared underlying assumption of much of this literature is that, by interacting, …rms learn from each other about technological and institutional innovations that raise productivity. While there is a body of rigorous research on technology di¤usion among farmers (Griliches and Lichtenberger 1984, Young and Burke 2001) , much of the existing literature on manufacturing …rms remains fairly descriptive, relying principally on case studies (Sutton 1998, Sonobe and Otsuka 2011) . While much can be learned from such studies, the danger is that too much weight is given to rare or unusual events. For instance, it has been argued that, by di¤using innovations, the sending by Daewoo of Bangladeshi workers to Korea for training played a key role in the emergence of a successful garment industry in Dacca (Doshi 2011 ). The problem with this kind of evidence is that it leaves out many situations in which workers were sent abroad for training but did not trigger the emergence of a new industry in their home country. Whatever rigorous evidence there is on the di¤usion of innovations across …rms pertains to developed economies. Helmers (2010) , for instance, documents technology di¤usion across …rms in UK business incubators. There is shortage of rigorous statistical evidence on the di¤usion of innovations across …rms in developing countries.
The purpose of this paper is to o¤er statistical evidence about the possible di¤usion of innovations among …rms. Our aim is modest: we examine whether innovative business practices are correlated more between …rms when they are close in a network or market sense. We are fully aware that …nding evidence of correlation does not prove di¤usion: business practices could be correlated across …rms because of contextual e¤ects, such as the in ‡uence of a common, and possibly unobserved, factor. But …nding no evidence of correlation suggests that business practices do not di¤use as much or as easily as is often believed.
There are two important caveats to this interpretation. The …rst is that di¤usion be slow enough to be observed in cross-section data: if new practices di¤use very fast and all …rms belong to a single connected network, the probability that we would observe an economy in the middle of a di¤usion process is small. The second caveat is that strategic complementarities in the adoption of new practices must dominate possible strategic substitution e¤ects between …rms.
Put di¤erently, it must be true that adoption by some raise the incentive for other, proximate …rms to adopt as well. For the kind of business practices that we study, these two caveats are a priori likely to be satis…ed.
We also investigate which measure of proximity best accounts for correlation in practices. This can suggest possible avenues for future enquiry. For instance, if we …nd that …rms that buy and sell from each other share certain practices, this suggests that direct contact between …rms may be important for di¤usion. If in contrast we …nd more correlation in innovative practices among …rms that sell to the same clients or to clients in the same region, this suggests that competition for customers may provide a strong impetus for …rms to imitate each other.
We use cross-section survey data collected in Ethiopia and Sudan. These two countries are good candidates to study di¤usion. First, they cover a very large area and both have a small manufacturing sector, making interaction between …rms less frequent and di¤usion more problematic. Given this, it is more likely that we observe di¤erences in business practices across …rms because di¤usion is not complete. Secondly, the average technological level of the surveyed …rms is low, thus leaving much room for even simple innovations to boost productivity. Finally, both countries have little economic contact with the rest of the world. In the case of Ethiopia, this is partly due to the fact that the country is landlocked and mountainous, partly to a history of relative economic isolation. In the case of Sudan, the relative lack of economic interaction with the rest of the world results partly from years of civil warfare, partly from the size of the country relative to its population, and partly to international sanctions. Relative isolation means that there is more room for di¤usion to take place among domestic …rms rather than directly from foreign to individual domestic …rms. Given this, domestic networks should matter more, facilitating inference.
We …nd some evidence of correlation in business practices. But the evidence is less convincing than one would expect if di¤usion e¤ects were strong. We also …nd evidence that, along some dimensions -principally geographical distance, …rms are more similar to distant …rms that to those located nearby. This suggests that some adoption decisions are local strategic substitutes:
if some …rms adopt a certain practice, this may reduce the incentive for others to do likewise. This is partly con…rmed by noting that the practices for which we …nd evidence of strategic substitutes -R&D, vocational training to workers -are those most vulnerable to free riding by other …rms.
What should we make of these results? First we again note that correlation in practices does not imply di¤usion; there may be unobserved contextual e¤ects. Secondly, the evidence presented here does not imply that the di¤usion of innovation between …rms can never be important or even critical. We only say that di¤usion between …rms should not be taken for granted: many of the …rms in our sample follow antiquated business practices even when some neighboring …rms do not. Thirdly, it is possible that we looked for di¤usion in the wrong place, i.e., among existing …rms. Perhaps the di¤usion of innovations takes place not so much because existing …rms learn to imitate each other, but rather because new …rms emerge that adopt innovative practices. This interpretation is consistent with …ndings reported in the exporting literature, e.g., there is limited evidence that incumbent …rms learn from exporting, but ample evidence that …rms that begin exporting are more productive than average, even when they are new entrants (Fafchamps, El Hamine and Zeufack 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework and some key methodological issues. Section 3 provides information about the data. Econometric results are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.
Conceptual Framework

Di¤usion
In recent years, theoretical models of di¤usion have made much progress thanks to the work of physicists and epidemiologists working on the spread of diseases. The novelty is to model di¤usion as operating on a network, where nodes represent individuals and a link between two nodes exists if one node can communicate the disease to the other. We refer to Jackson (2009) and Vega-Redondo (2006) for excellent summaries of this literature. What this work has shown is that, in the long run, diseases tend to di¤use to all connected nodes. Hence nodes that are connected, that is, that are in the same component will either all be infected or all be uninfected.
This means that, in the steady state, infection is correlated among nodes in the same component but, within components, network distance does not matter.
In the short run, however, this is not the case: even within components infection rates are more similar between nodes that are close to each other in the sense of having a shorter network distance between them. This is because the disease spreads along the network so that, if a node i is infected, then it is more likely to have -directly or indirectly -passed or received the disease to a node j that is close than to a node k that is more distant in the network. This simple observation forms the basis of our testing strategy.
The circulation of information among economic agents can be modeled in a similar fashion.
Let i and j be two agents in a population of size N and let a link g ij exist between them if i and j share information. Assume that one agent in the population, say k, learns a new piece of information and shares this information with its network neighbors who, in turn, share it with their own neighbors, etc. Let y i = 1 if agent/node i knows this information and y i = 0 otherwise. By the same reasoning as in the case of diseases, the new information progressively di¤uses across all connected nodes until y i = 1 for all nodes directly or indirectly connected to k. Before the information reaches all nodes in the component, however, we expect that y i and y j to be more similar (either both 0 or both 1) if i and j are close in the network. 1 Now consider that the new information is about the usefulness of an innovation. More precisely, assume that node k discovers (or learns about) a new pro…table practice. If adoption of the new practice is individually optimal for each agent in the di¤usion network, we expect adoption of the new practice to di¤use in the same way information about its pro…tability di¤uses, and hence, before the new practice di¤uses to all connected nodes, we expect adoption to be more similar across proximate nodes than across distant nodes.
Strategic complements
Whether or not adoption is individual rational may depend on the number or proportion of adopters in one's immediate neighborhood. In particular, it is common for innovations to be strategic complements between …rms: the incentive to adopt a new technology or business practice often increases with adoption by others nearby. This is especially true for contractual practices.
To illustrate this, consider invoicing in a world where cash-and-carry is the norm. Relative to cash-and-carry, it is easier for …rms to conduct business if suppliers invoice clients at the end of the month for the deliveries made during that month. This is because invoicing decreases transactions costs and reduces the need to carry and transport large cash balances Minten 2001, Fafchamps 2004 ). But suppose a single supplier introduces invoicing while others continue to insist on payment upon delivery. Negative shock to clients' businesses will trigger defaults or delayed payment towards the invoicing supplier but not towards others. This means that the invoicing supplier bears all the risk of non-payment. If this risk is large enough, no supplier will want to switch to invoicing unless other suppliers do the same.
In this case, decentralized di¤usion is still possible but is more di¢ cult. To illustrate this point, imagine that each client has two suppliers and each supplier has two clients, and that suppliers and clients are staggered as in Figure 1 . Suppliers can either sell with payment upon delivery or using invoicing, but they must treat all their clients the same. Further assume that a supplier is unwilling to switch to invoicing if none of the other suppliers of its two clients o¤ers invoicing, but is willing to switch if at least one the other suppliers o¤ers invoicing. In this case, it is possible for invoicing to spread. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Suppose that supplier S 1 adopts invoicing at time t 0 . It then becomes optimal for supplier S 2 to adopt invoicing in the next period t 1 . This in turn induces supplier S 3 to adopt invoicing at time t 2 , and so on.
What the Figure illustrates is that, until all suppliers have adopted the new practice, adoption behavior is more similar between suppliers who share the same clients -or among clients who share the same suppliers since, in this case, clients enjoy the bene…ts of invoicing from their suppliers.
Strategic substitutes
It is also possible for adoption decisions to be strategic substitutes. Since our purpose is empirical, it is beyond the scope of this paper to o¤er a general model of strategic substitutes.
We propose instead to illustrate our reasoning with a simple example. Imagine that two supermarkets must locate on a circle. Customers shop at their nearest supermarket to minimize transactions costs. In the two supermarkets locate as far away from each other as possible, e.g., North and South, and attract half of the customers. The reason is that territorial overlap generates more competition and reduces pro…ts. Now introduce small stores that do not directly compete with the supermarket but bene…t from an agglomeration externality -e.g., a shopping mall. In equilibrium we expect to observe a combination of supermarket and small stores in North and South.
To see how this model generates some intuition for innovation adoption, think of supermarkets as modern …rms. They compete with each other for customers and, though some Schumpeterian process, copy each other's innovations. Consequently their practices will be sim-ilar even though they are located far from each other geographically and do not share customers.
In contrast, think of the small shops as …rms serving a localized niche market. Since they are not in direct competition with the modern …rm, there is less Schumpeterian pressure for them to adopt the same practices. Hence they can a¤ord to remain fairly traditional in the way they operate, free riding on the local externalities generated by the modern …rm. In this world, we should observe that …rms'business practices are, on average, more similar with those of distant …rms than with those of neighboring …rms.
For instance, one …rm may set up an R&D department to facilitate the adaptation of innovations from elsewhere to its products and production process. This in turn may reduce the incentive of other nearby …rms to develop their own R&D department because they can free ride on the technology adaptation and product development of the R&D …rm. Vocational training is another possible example: if one …rm upgrades the skills of its workers, other nearby …rms may choose instead to hire trained workers away instead of o¤ering their own training.
Yet another example is reputational punishment. Suppose that one …rm circulates information about good and bad clients to other …rms in the vicinity, and refuses to trade with bad clients. Nearby …rms bene…t from this information because it helps screen out bad clients. They may also bene…t from the punishment imposed on bad clients if this punishment forces them out of business. They enjoy these bene…ts even if they do not, themselves, share information on good and bad clients. They may even …nd that punished bad clients are now willing to accept less attractive transaction terms from them (Fafchamps 2010 ).
Much of the literature on the adoption of new institutions and technologies has explicitly or
implicitly assumed that innovations di¤use, which implies that adoption decisions are strategic complements. Yet we have presented some examples, not altogether unreasonable, in which adoption decisions are strategic substitutes. It is therefore fair to say that, on a priori grounds, we do not know a priori whether all adoption decisions are strategic complements or substitutes and, if they di¤er, which are more likely to fall into one category or the other.
Testing strategy
Our testing strategy is inspired of the above reasoning. Each enterprise is a node. We observe whether an enterprise i has adopted a practice y i . Vector g ij represents network links between two enterprises i and j while d ij represents the geographical distance between them. We want to test whether two enterprises i and j are more likely to have a similar practice if they are close in a network and geographical sense, that is, if g ij = 1 for some element of g ij or if d ij is small. We estimate a model of the form:
where x ij is a set of control variables included to reduce omitted variable bias and u ij is an error term and the greek letters are coe¢ cients to be estimated. As explained in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), equation (2.1) works irrespective of whether y i is a continuous or dichotomous variable. A negative in (2.1) means that y is more similar when …rms i and j have a link g ij . For geographical distance d ij the interpretation of the sign of ! is reversed. Conversely a positive or negative ! means that linked or nearby …rms are more dissimilar. If slow di¤usion takes place along network g ij we expect adoption decisions to be more similar if …rms are linked,
i.e., if g ij = 1, and hence we expect < 0. If di¤usion is faster within a region than across regions, we expect ! > 0.
If di¤usion is very rapid, we do not expect to observe any di¤erence in behavior between …rms in the same component. If all …rms belong to the same component then (2.1) reveals nothing about the di¤usion process. In contrast, if di¤usion is rapid but …rms are in di¤erent components, then adoption decisions should be more similar among …rms in the same component.
Since we do not observe the entire relevant network, we do not have the information required to identify components. But we can hazard some guesses. Given the size of the two countries we study, arguably the most serious obstacle to di¤usion is geographical distance which, in both countries, is potentially compounded by ethnic di¤erentiation. If geographical distance divides …rms into unconnected sub-graphs, then …rms located near each other should be more similar and we should observe a strong positive !. Similarly, if di¤usion does take place across sectors, …rms in di¤erent sectors should be more similar to each other than those in di¤erent sectors.
While there is a clear theoretical distinction between rapid di¤usion within distinct components and slow di¤usion within a connected network, for our purpose this distinction is empirically irrelevant: if all …rms belong to a single connected network but di¤usion is more rapid within a region or sector, then our methodology will pick this up, and that is what matters. What we are ultimately interested in is to identify along which dimensions -geographical, sectoral, network-based -di¤usion is most likely to take place.
Since by construction, jy i y j j = jy j y i j, it follows that x ij regressors must be formulated such that:
This implies that network and geographical proximity regressors in g ij must be undirectional, i.e., such that g ij = g ji for each g in g. Similarly we need x ji = x ij . The purpose of including x ij is to control for similarity in characteristics between …rms that may be correlated with proximity g ij , and hence to reduce omitted variable bias. Let z i denote one such characteristic. To ensure that x ji = x ij , we follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and create regressors of the form jz i z j j.
The estimated model is:
2)
A positive and signi…cant means that …rms that share a similar z tend to have a more similar y.
Equation (2.2) is a dyadic regression model. The dependent and independent variables are de…ned for every pair of …rms i, j in the data, which implies there will be n (n 1) observations underlying the regression (n denoting the number of …rms). Dyadic observations are typically not independent since residual u ij is likely to be correlated with u ik . This complicates the computation of standard errors. In particular, robust standard errors must correct for crossobservation correlation in the error terms involving the same enterprises. To obtain consistent standard errors, we use bootstrapping. Let b and b denote the parameter estimates obtained from estimating (2.2). Bootstrapping is implemented as follows: (i) we draw a random sample s of n …rms by drawing from the …rm-level dataset with replacement; (ii) for this simulated sample of n …rms we construct the corresponding n(n 1) dependent variables jy i y j j s , links g s ij and controls x s ij ; (iii) we estimate equation ( As emphasized in the introduction, a signi…cantly positive does not by itself imply network di¤usion: …rms i and j may have correlated technology and contractual practices for reasons other than network or geographical proximity, e.g., because they are subjected to similar contextual e¤ects not adequately controlled by x ij . If unobserved contextual e¤ects are correlated with proximity g ij , they would bias above 0. Hence if we …nd a signi…cantly positive , it may be due to di¤usion or to unobserved contextual e¤ects. However, if we …nd that is negative or not signi…cantly di¤erent from 0, it means that the net e¤ect of di¤usion and contextual e¤ects is likely to be negative or zero. The only possible exception is if di¤usion is rapid and all …rms belong to a single connected network, in which case our identi…cation strategy will fail. But if di¤usion is rapid among all …rms, then we should observe little variation in practices among …rms which, as we will see, is not what we …nd. If we believe, as is reasonable, that unobserved contextual e¤ects could only generate positive correlation in technology and business practices, then a non-signi…cant indicates that network di¤usion is 0 while a negative suggests the presence of strategic substitution e¤ects in adoption decisions.
Data
To implement our testing strategy we use detailed …rm-level data collected under the leadership of the World Bank in Ethiopia and Sudan. Virtually the same questionnaire and sampling strategies were used in the two countries. One of the authors was involved in the partial design of the questionnaire. Approximately half of the observations come from Addis Ababa. As shown on the map in Figure   2 , the survey has wide geographical coverage, with long distances between some of the …rms in the sample. The average distance between any two …rms is 282 kilometers. The longest distance recorded in these data is 876 kilometers, which is the distance between Dilla in the South and businesses have been shown to be less growth oriented (see also Fafchamps 2003) . We also include …rm size, as proxied by the (log of) total …rm employment. The average log employment is 3.37 in Ethiopia, which corresponds to 29 employees. The largest …rm in the sample employs more than 3,000 employees. For Sudan, the average log size is 2.91 which corresponds to 18
employees.
Next we report information on …rm technology and business practices. We focus on variables that show some variation across …rms in the two samples we have. Practices that vary little across …rms are ignored since they o¤er little or no information about di¤usion. For instance, most if not all sampled …rms in the two countries have a bank account but virtually none has an ISO certi…cation. 2 From the point of view of entrepreneurs in the two study countries, both practices are innovations but one has been fully adopted by the surveyed …rms 3 while for the latter adoption has barely begun.
In the conceptual section we built on Jackson (2009) to argue that the stronger strategic complementarities are, the harder it is for decentralized di¤usion to take place in loosely connected networks. We thus begin by reporting variables for which strategic complementarities across …rms are a priori thought to be less strong, such as the adoption of technological innovations; we end with variables for which strategic complementarities are likely to be largest, such as reputation mechanisms.
Within each category, adoption by a given …rm may be correlated across individual practices, either positively or negatively (e.g., if some practices are partial substitutes for each other). In this case, examining each practice separately is likely to yield ine¢ cient inference. To guard against this possibility, we summarized the available information within each category using factor analysis. The principal component of each category is reported in Table 1 and used as additional dependent variable.
Adoption of any of the practices listed in Table 1 Information on internal governance and investment in human capital is presented next. We …rst report the ratio of non-production to production workers. Non-production workers include professionals, managers, administrators, and sales personnel. Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) argue that this ratio is related to the ease with which …rms manage their labor force, and they
show that many African …rms are top-heavy, with a high ratio of production-to-non-production workers in spite of the relative simplicity of their production processes. Here we …nd a higher ratio in Sudan than in Ethiopia, consistent with …rms'lower capacity to manage their workforce with a small number of clerks and managers. Labor management can be facilitated if workers are better trained. Surveyed …rms were asked whether they had provided any in-house training to their workers, or sent any of them to a formal training course in the year preceding the survey.
In both countries a substantial minority of …rms did provide training to their workers, but the majority did not. unused to working in a hierarchical environment, the …rm may need to hire more middle management and clerical workers in information processing, monitoring, and coordination tasks. Hence a …rm that …rst institutes a multi-tiered structure may bene…t others through the learning e¤ect it has on the workforce. These e¤ects, however, are likely to extend beyond the manufacturing sector which, in the two study countries, accounts for a small proportion of total employment.
Still, we may observe some similarities among …rms that are close in a network sense.
The next panel of Table 1 covers contractual practices. Firms were asked whether they import inputs directly from abroad. The alternative is to source inputs locally or to purchase inputs from an importer. Buying directly from abroad requires trust but is likely to improve the adequacy of the raw materials to the …rm's production process. We …nd some di¤erence between the two countries, with landlocked Ethiopia lagging behind Sudan. Firms were also asked whether they sell on credit to any of their customers. The main alternative is payment on delivery. A majority of manufacturing …rms sell on credit to at least some of their customers, but a large minority do not. The data also show that sub-contracting part of production to other …rms is rare.
Importing directly from suppliers abroad -as opposed to buying from a local importer -requires a modicum of trust that ultimately relies on a good market environment -e.g., predictability of the handling and custom operations at the port of entry. Presumably, the more …rms import directly, the more knowledge they collectively acquire regarding procedures and sources of supply, and the more this information can di¤use among …rms. There is therefore room for di¤usion of practices through the di¤usion of information along business networks.
Supplier credit is closely associated with invoicing, and was used in the conceptual section as example of strategic complementarities across …rms: the more likely other suppliers are to o¤er supplier credit to clients, the less perilous it is to o¤er supplier credit as well. According to this reasoning, we expect supplier credit to di¤use more easily among suppliers who have the same clients -or clients in the same geographical area.
Next we examine the extent to which surveyed …rms rely on reputation to enforce contracts with suppliers and clients. Respondents were asked …ve closely related questions as follows:
1. If you have a dispute with a customer, will other customers …nd out?
2. If some other …rm has a dispute with customer, will you refuse to deal with the customer?
3. If you have a dispute with a customer, will other …rms refuse to deal with the customer?
4. If you have a dispute with a supplier, will other suppliers …nd out?
5. If you have a dispute with a supplier, will other …rms refuse to deal with the supplier?
For each of these questions we code y = 2 for yes, y = 1 for maybe / don't know, and y = 0 for no, hence high values correspond to stronger reputation e¤ects. The summary statistics presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that news about a dispute often travel to customers and suppliers. They also suggest that the reputational sanction imposed on customers and suppliers involved in a dispute is not severe: …rms typically continue to deal with customers and suppliers Firm performance indicators are reported at the bottom of Table 1 . The …rst variable in the list is (the log of) value added per employee, expressed in US$, which is a crude indicator of productivity. 4 The country averages for this variable correspond to USD 1,700 for Ethiopia and USD 5,900 for Sudan. We also report available information about reported growth in employment and revenue. 5 Surveyed …rms often report considerable growth in employment and revenue, although there is massive variation across …rms and between years, as suggested by the comparison between the one-year growth and the three-year growth in revenues.
A key module of the survey contains information about the names of the …rms' trading partners and their approximate geographical location. Respondents were asked to name up to three clients and three suppliers. They were also asked to provide the geographical location where each of the listed clients and suppliers is based. Using the information from this module, we construct simple measures of network proximity between …rms in the two samples. These measures are reported in Table 2 .
We begin by constructing a dyadic dataset of unique …rm pairs. For instance, there are 304 …rms in the Ethiopian sample. This means that there exist 304 303=2 = 46; 056 unique enterprise pairs (i; j) in that sample. For each i; j pairs, we construct dummy variables capturing di¤erent concepts of network proximity. When two …rms are close in the sense of that network, we say they are linked. The most direct network proximity measure we use is whether i and j buy or sell from each other. We are only able to identify a small number of such links in our data -60 in Ethiopia and 5 in Sudan. That there are so few upstream and downstream links among sample …rms is partly driven by the focus of the surveys on light manufacturing sector for which clients seldom are manufacturers.
We also construct dummy variables indicating whether i and j have a common supplier or 4 Surveyed …rms were asked to estimate the replacement value of their equipment and machinery, but much of this information is either missing or unreliable. This is hardly surprising given how thin the secondary market for equipment is in both countries. It is therefore very di¢ cult for respondents to estimate how much it would cost to replace their -often antiquated -equipment. 5 Reported as the log(Xt=Xt 1) where X is employment or revenue, respectively. If the growth g rate of X is small, then log(Xt=Xt 1) g. a common client. These types of links are more common: there are 481 (171) supplier-based links and 273 (678) client-based links in the Ethiopian (Sudanese) data, respectively. The next proximity dummy is whether i and j belong to the same manufacturing sector. The last one is geographical distance, already discussed earlier in this Section. These …ve proximity variables constitute our g ij vector.
Empirical Analysis
As explained in conceptual section, our objective is to test whether the indicators of innovation adoption listed in Table 1 are more similar among …rms that are close according to the network proximity variables listed in Table 2 . To recall, the model we estimate is of the form:
A large value of the dependent variable means that …rms i and j are dissimilar in terms of y. 6 The vector g ij includes dummy variables for whether …rms i and j buy from, or sell to, each other, have a common supplier, and a common client. The null hypothesis is that di¤erences in the rate of di¤usion cannot be attributed to network status. This would be the case if technology or contractual practices, for example, spread equally fast (or slowly) within and between networks.
In contrast, if di¤usion is more rapid within than between networks, E [jy i y j j] should be lower across linked than non-linked …rms. In this case, we would obtain a negative coe¢ cient on the relevant network indicator(s) in the vector g ij . For geographical distance d ij , de…ned as the log of the distance between i and j plus one, the interpretation of the sign of ! is the opposite. Note that the results from our analysis will be uninformative about the absolute speed of di¤usion.
What they do shed some light on is whether there are systematic di¤erences depending on network status.
The set of control variables z are those reported in the top panel of Table 1 ; they include a dummy equal to 1 if i and j belong to the same sector, and absolute di¤erences across i and j in …rm age, education of the manager, experience of the manager, gender of the owner, and …rm size proxied by the log of the number of employees. A positive coe¢ cient on jz i z j j thus implies that the outcome variable y is more similar for …rms that have a similar variable z. We estimate the model (4.1) using linear regression (OLS). Standard errors are bootstrapped so as to be robust to heteroskedasticity and dyadic correlation in the error terms across enterprises. 7
Technology
We begin by investigating the association between network proximity and technology acquisition and usage. We construct dyadic dependent variables using data on whether …rms have introduced a new product or technology in the year preceding the survey; whether the …rms do any R&D; and the extent of IT usage. 8 Results are shown in Table 3 , columns [1]- [3] for Ethiopia and columns [5]- [7] for Sudan. In columns [4] and [8] we report similar results using the principal component of all three categories as dependent variable.
In both countries, estimated coe¢ cients of the same sector dummy are negative throughout, and signi…cant in a number of individual regressions and for principal components. This indicates that …rms in the same sector tend to have similar practices in terms of technology acquisition and usage. 7 The reason we use bootstrapping instead of the approach suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) is that their formula, based on that of Conley (1999) , is not guaranteed to generate positive variances, and this raises problems in our data. 8 Recall we distinguish three levels of IT usage in the data, thus the underlying variable is set to 0 if IT is not used at all; 1 if the …rm uses e-mail; and 2 if the enterprise has a business website.
The estimated e¤ects of network proximity di¤er quite a bit across the two countries. For Ethiopia, the coe¢ cients on the dummies for whether i and j trade with each other, have a common supplier, and a common client are small and statistically insigni…cant throughout. For Sudan, however, we …nd strong negative e¤ects of trade and having a common supplier on the absolute dyadic di¤erence in the R&D variable. That is, Sudanese …rms that trade with each other, or have a common supplier, tend to record a more similar behavior with respect to R&D than other …rms. These e¤ects are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Firms in Sudan that have a common supplier also tend to di¤er less than other …rms with respect to IT usage.
Not surprisingly, the coe¢ cient of the same supplier dummy is also negative and statistically signi…cant in the principal component regression.
We further …nd that Sudanese …rms with a common client tend to di¤er more than other …rms with respect to R&D and IT usage. This could be because clients concentrate purchases of a certain type of product to a single …rm. For example, suppose a client demands sophisticated products and simple products. Suppose the client buys all the sophisticated products from a …rm that specializes in the production of such goods (which requires R&D) and all the simple products from a di¤erent …rm that specializes in simple goods (which does not require R&D).
In such a case, …rms that share the same client …ll di¤erent, rather than similar, client needs.
This would give rise to the empirical result observed here. Now consider the role of geographical distance between …rms. As discussed in Section 2, quite di¤erent mechanisms may be at play. On the one hand, geographical distance may be a serious obstacle to technology di¤usion. On the other hand, adoption decisions may be local strategic substitutes. The regression results suggest that strategic substitution e¤ects dominate strategic complementarities normally associated with technology di¤usion. For Ethiopia, the distance coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level or better in all three models.
That is, closer geographical proximity tends to be associated with greater di¤erences, with respect to technology acquisition. This is consistent with the 'supermarket'model discussed in Section 2. For Sudan the results are similar: the distance coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant in the models for R&D and IT usage, and for the principal component. Dyadic di¤erences in the introduction of a new technology or product, however, appear not to be related to geographical distance for Sudan, perhaps because the e¤ects of di¤usion and strategic substitution cancel each other out in this case.
The control variables in these regressions have some explanatory power. The coe¢ cient on the dummy for whether i and j belong to the same sector is negative and signi…cant in three of the speci…cations, suggesting that technology acquisition tends to be more similar across …rms in to the same sector than across …rms in di¤erent sectors. The coe¢ cient on …rm size is positive in all speci…cations and statistically signi…cant in …ve of the models considered. This implies that …rms of similar size tend to record similar patterns of technology upgrading. The coe¢ cient on gender di¤erence is positive and signi…cant in three of the speci…cations, suggesting that individuals of the same sex select similar technology. For the remaining control variables, the results are weaker and more mixed. Di¤erences in managers'experience do not seem to matter except for IT usage in Ethiopia where we …nd a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient. Firm age has insigni…cant coe¢ cients across all speci…cations except in column (6) where the e¤ect is negative and signi…cant. The coe¢ cients on managers'experience are insigni…cant throughout. Table 4 shows regression results for models of human capital and internal governance of …rms.
Human capital and internal governance
Our measure of internal governance, namely the ratio of non-production workers to total employment, is only weakly related to the explanatory variables: in both Ethiopia and Sudan we cannot reject the hypothesis that all slope coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero. Internal governance, at least to the extent we can measure it, seems to be idiosyncratic to individual …rms.
For in-house and external training, in contrast, we …nd some evidence of similarity across …rms in the same industry: the 'same sector' dummy is signi…cant for one of the training regressions in both Ethiopia and Sudan. The coe¢ cients on direct link and same supplier dummies, however, are never signi…cant.
We also …nd some evidence of substitution e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on distance is negative and statistically signi…cant in both training regressions for Ethiopia and in the in-house training regression in Sudan. This implies that, other things being equal, …rms located close to each other tend to di¤er more with respect their skills upgrading decisions than …rms located far apart.
We also …nd that the coe¢ cient of the common client dummy is positive and is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in two cases. This means that …rms with a common client have more di¤erent training policies than if they do not share a common client.
Why this is the case is not entirely clear. One possibility, often emphasized in the literature on agglomeration e¤ects (e.g., Henderson 1988; Glaser et al. 1992) , is that …rms hire workers trained by other …rms: the more other …rms nearby provide the necessary training, the less they need to do so themselves. If …rms that sell to the same clients produce close substitutes, they probably have similar production technology and similar manpower needs and can thus free ride on the training o¤ered by other …rms. Training decisions thus appear to be strategic substitutes.
With respect to other coe¢ cients, we …nd that, as could be expected, …rms of similar size tend to adopt more similar training decisions than …rms of di¤ering size. This probably re ‡ects underlying di¤erences in the need for skills across …rms of di¤ering size. We also note that the coe¢ cients on the other control variables are mostly insigni…cant; where they are signi…cant, the coe¢ cients are negative, which further supports the notion that similarities in characteristics sometimes imply di¤erences in decisions.
Contractual practices
Next we investigate whether contractual practices correlate across …rms. We focus on three measures of contractual practices: whether the …rm imports inputs directly; whether it sells on credit; and whether it sub-contracts part of its production. Results are shown in Table 5 .
For Sudan we …nd a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient on the direct link dummy on direct imports, selling on credit, and for the principal component regression: …rms that buy and sell from each other tend to have more similar contractual practices. Sudanese …rms that have a common supplier also tend to di¤er less than other …rms with respect to direct imports, although this e¤ect is only statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. For Ethiopia, in contrast, the correlation between network proximity and similarity in contractual practices is weak and largely inconclusive.
Distance coe¢ cients vary a lot across regressions. In two regressions they are positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (direct import and selling on credit in Sudan), suggesting that …rms located close by have more similar contractual practices. But in two other regressions the coe¢ cients are signi…cantly negative (direct import in Ethiopia and subcontracting in Sudan).
In both countries distance is not signi…cant in the principal component regressions. It is thus hard to see a pattern here, perhaps because the relative importance of strategic substitution and di¤usion varies from one contractual practice to another.
Reputation mechanisms
We now examine whether there is any evidence in our data that network links facilitate the di¤usion of information on contractual disputes between suppliers and clients. To this e¤ect, we rely on the data on the perceived consequences of disputes discussed in Section 3. Coding y i = 2 for yes, y i = 1 for maybe / don't know, and y i = 0 for no, we compute jy i y j j for every pair of …rms in the data and use this as dependent variable. The theoretical literature has emphasized the role that di¤usion of information on contractual disputes along social networks plays in the development of modern market institutions (e.g., North 1990 , Greif 1993 ). Consequently we expect to …nd a strong correlation in answers along social networks.
Regression results, shown in Table 6 As pointed out Section 2, there are two possible interpretations to these …ndings: either information about contractual disputes does not di¤use along the kind of social networks we have able to measure; or information di¤use so well that social links do not matter. One way to identify which of these two interpretation is more likely is to examine the coe¢ cient of the distance variable: even though information may di¤use rapidly along social networks within certain areas, information di¤usion need not happen everywhere. This is because strategic complementarities in di¤usion create the possibility of multiple equilibria. If this is the case, we expect to …nd that …rms located far away from each other perceive the consequences of contractual disputes di¤erently.
This is not what we …nd. For Ethiopia, the distance coe¢ cient is negative and highly signi…cant in three of the speci…cations but positive and weakly signi…cant in the remaining two. The principal component of the …ve individual variables is negatively and signi…cantly related to distance. For Sudan, the distance coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant in two out of …ve individual regressions, and in the remaining cases it is not statistically signi…cant. These …ndings are di¢ cult to reconcile with the idea of widespread di¤usion of contractual information among …rms in the same location. If multiple equilibria are present, they seem to coexist within locations, so that some …rms recognize there are reputational consequences to contractual disputes, while others in the same location do not.
Firm performance and growth
So far we have focused on technology decisions and business practices that may di¤use along social networks. In this sub-section we focus on …rm performance directly: ultimately we care about the adoption of technological and institutional innovations because we believe that they improve …rm productivity and performance. While we have found social network e¤ects to be rather weak, some of our empirical results are consistent with strategic substitution. We now investigate whether these results are mirrored in labor productivity and growth rates.
These are crude indicators of …rm performance, but they are easier to measure than total factor productivity which we do not have su¢ cient data to estimate for each …rm.
In modeling these outcomes, the dependent variable is de…ned as before as the absolute di¤erence between to the two …rms performance indicators. Results are shown in Table 7 . In Ethiopia we …nd little evidence that …rms that are closer in the social network sense have more similar performances: the same supplier dummy is the only statistically signi…cant network variable, but has the wrong sign. The situation is not improved by combining the available performance information into a single principal component variable. In Sudan, we …nd that …rms that share the same supplier have consistently more similar performances than …rms that do not.
We also …nd a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient for the direct link dummy in the employment regression, and a signi…cant coe¢ cient for the same client dummy in the employment growth regression. As in earlier Tables, we …nd limited evidence that there is more dissimilarity among …rms located nearby: distance has a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient in two of the regressionsbut it is signi…cantly positive in another. The overall conclusion from Table 7 is that network links and geographical proximity are not associated with convergence in performance across …rms.
Robustness
We conducted a large number of robustness checks. Firstly, for continuous variables y i we repeated the analysis using covariance in outcomes rather than the absolute di¤erence as dependent variable. We thus compute (y i y) (y j y) for every pair of …rms in our data and use this as dependent variable. Note that this a¤ects the interpretation of the signs of the estimated coe¢ cients. If di¤usion is stronger within than between networks, for example, we expect E [(y i y) (y j y)] to be higher across linked than non-linked …rms and thus the coe¢ cient on the relevant network indicator(s) in the vector g ij should be positive. Keeping this caveat in mind, results are fairly similar to those reported here in the sense that they fail to provide strong evidence of network e¤ects in Ethiopia.
To investigate whether strategic substitution primarily operations within sectors, we add an interaction term between distance and the same sector dummy. If strategic substitution is stronger within sectors, the interaction term should be negative. There's no support for this idea in the data. Only in 2 cases out of a total of 46 regressions do we get a signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term, and in both cases the coe¢ cient is positive rather than negative.
The results thus suggest that, within local markets, …rms tend to be di¤erent from each other regardless of sector. Why strategic substitution e¤ects operate across sectors is unclear. It could be due, for example, to the fact that few consumers can a¤ord to buy expensive high-tech products. In this case, if there's a high-tech textile …rm in an area, it may not be a good idea to set up a high-tech metal …rm in the same area because there is limited purchasing power for high-tech consumer products; it is better for a new entrant to produce low-tech metal products.
Similar examples could be constructed for the decision to train workers or to o¤er credit to customers.
Conclusions
In this paper we have documented empirical patterns of correlation in the adoption of technological innovation and contractual practices among manufacturing …rms in Ethiopia and Sudan.
Our empirical analysis is based on network data indicating whether any two …rms in our sample do business with each other, whether they buy inputs from a common supplier, and whether they sell output to a common client.
Our results provide limited support for the commonly held idea that …rms that are more proximate in a network sense are more likely to adopt similar contractual and technological innovation practices. In this respect the strongest results are for technology and for …rm performance, but for the latter only in Sudan.
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